Catholic University Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 4 Summer 2014

Article 5

10-17-2014

Searching for Culpability, Punishing the Guilty, and Protecting the
Innocent: Should Congress Look to the Model Penal Code to Stem
the Tide of Federal Overcriminalization?
David Dailey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Dailey, Searching for Culpability, Punishing the Guilty, and Protecting the Innocent: Should Congress
Look to the Model Penal Code to Stem the Tide of Federal Overcriminalization?, 63 Cath. U. L. Rev. 997
(2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol63/iss4/5

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

SEARCHING FOR CULPABILITY, PUNISHING THE
GUILTY, AND PROTECTING THE INNOCENT:
SHOULD CONGRESS LOOK TO THE MODEL PENAL
CODE TO STEM THE TIDE OF FEDERAL
OVERCRIMINALIZATION?
David Dailey+
Wade Martin, a resident of Sitka, Alaska, received a jarring visit from state
police.1 Martin had been charged with violating the Marine Mammal Protection
Act and pled guilty because, according to his lawyer, the government would not
be required to prove that he had any criminal intent when making the sale.2 The
federal Marine Mammal Protection Act allows coastal Native Alaskans to trap
and hunt certain protected species and sell them to fellow natives, an exemption
that is not provided for any other group. 3 Martin, a native coastal Alaskan
familiar with the requirements of this particular federal statute, sold ten sea otters
to someone he believed was a native, but who was actually a non-native.4 Martin
was fined $1,000 and sentenced to two years probation. 5 Despite Martin’s
innocent mistake and the fact that the government did not need to prove that
Martin intended to break the law, he was now a convicted criminal.

+
J.D., May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2007, The
American University. The author wishes to thank Ron LeGrand for his valuable comments, insight,
and guidance. The author also wishes to thank the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law
Review for their time and tremendous effort preparing this Comment for publication. Finally, the
author wishes to dedicate this Comment to the memory of his late father, David M. Dailey, who
instilled in him his strong work ethic, and whose memory and love will always be a source of
strength.
1. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt
Declines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060
604576570801651620000.html.
2. Id. The relevant penalty states:
Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this subchapter or of any permit or
regulation issued thereunder (except as provided in section 1387 of this title) shall, upon
conviction, be fined not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both.
16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (2012).
3. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1. Specifically, the exemption provides: “That any
edible portion of marine mammals may be sold in native villages and towns in Alaska or for native
consumption.” 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2).
4. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1. The law requires covered mammals sold to nonnatives be converted into handicrafts first. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2).
5. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1.
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The two basic elements of a crime are actus reus and mens rea.6 However,
strict liability offenses and general welfare offenses remove the government’s
burden to prove mens rea, which means a culpable or morally blameworthy state
of mind.7 Fundamentally, the mens rea required for common law offenses—
murder, rape, robbery, burglary, trespass, and conversion of property—are
widely known and, generally, considered to be accepted by society. 8 State
legislatures have codified these common law offenses and, even where the
statutes are silent with regards to the requisite intent, courts routinely infer that
the common law intent to these crimes remains intact.9
At the federal level, a similar approach is applied when Congress codifies a
typical common law offense but fails to include a specific intent element. 10
However, state legislatures and Congress have increasingly enacted criminal
offense statutes that are not found in the common law.11 It is estimated that there
are at minimum 4,450 offenses at the federal level that carry a criminal penalty12
and at least 10,000 (and maybe as many as 300,000) federal regulations that also
carry criminal sanctions.13 Several states have adopted the Model Penal Code’s
6. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 (5th ed. 2009)
(explaining that actus reus is the physical action of the crime, while mens rea is the mental
component).
7. Id. at 176–77.
8. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (recognizing intent as a
fundamental component of a criminal offense).
9. Id. at 252.
10. Id. at 262.
11. JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–10 (1998),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federaliz
ation_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf. The report commented that Congress is limited by the
Constitution in making conduct a federal crime and generally, Congress may only criminalize
activities in the following three areas: (1) conduct that “interfere[s] with the core functions of the
federal government” (for example, treason, controlling national borders, and protecting government
currency); (2) “[l]egislation essentially based on a federal relationship to the site of the crime” (such
as crimes that take place “on the high seas,” or “apply[ing] standards for certain federal lands and
American Indian reservations,” and other areas “where only the federal government can effectively
legislate”); and (3) “criminaliz[ing] [] conduct on a Commerce Clause basis.” Id. at 45–46.
12. John S. Barker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE FOUND.,
June 26, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm26.cfm. According to a recent
study by the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, between 2008 and 2013,
439 new criminal offenses were added to the United States Code, averaging almost 89 new criminal
offenses a year. Memorandum from Alison M. Smith, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv.,
& Richard M. Thompson II, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., to Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security & Investigations Subcommittee (H. Judiciary) (June 23, 2014).
13. See STRAZZELLA, supra note 11, at 10 (discussing criminal sanctions included within
federal regulations); see also Barker, supra note 12 (juxtaposing the various statistics regarding
federal regulations that carry criminal penalties). In prepared testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee’s Overcriminalization Taskforce, Steven Benjamin, the President of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, cited a report by the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Education that stated “that ‘a majority of [federal] offenses fail to protect the innocent with
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(MPC) default mens rea provisions to address overcriminalization at the state
level—but no similar provision exists at the federal level.14 Numerous journal
articles have been written on the topic of overcriminalization at the federal
level.15 Organizations, including the American Bar Association, the Heritage
Foundation, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, have
called on Congress to address the issue of overcriminalization.16
Congress may finally be heeding the calls for reform. On May 7, 2013, the
House Committee on the Judiciary established a bipartisan task force to study
the issue of overcriminalization at the federal level and to propose remedies.17
Advocates for reform at the federal level have advanced several specific
recommendations including enacting default mens rea rules similar to the MPC,
codifying the common law rule of lenity, requiring sequential referral to the
House and the Senate Judiciary Committees of any bill that would create new or
modify existing criminal offenses or penalties, and requiring Congress to include
accompanying reports explaining the justification, costs, and benefits of any new
criminal offense or penalty proposed.18
adequate mens rea requirements, [and] many of them are so vague, far-reaching, and imprecise that
few lawyers, much less non-lawyers, could determine what specific conduct they prohibit and
punish.’” Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-criminalization and Over-federalization:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task Force, 113th Cong. 7
(2013) (written statement of Steven D. Benjamin, President of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers) (quoting BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW
CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW X (2010),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=10287&terms=withoutintent)
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/06142013/Benjamin%2006142013.pdf. Norman
Reimer, the Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers pointed
out that “Congress frequently turns hundreds, even thousands, of administrative and civil
regulations into strict liability criminal offenses by enacting just one law that criminalizes ‘knowing
violations’ of said regulations or provides blanket regulatory authority enforceable with criminal
penalties.” Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal Law:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task Force, 113th Cong. 7
(2013) [hereinafter The Need for a Meaningful Intent] (written statement of Norman L. Reimer,
Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)) (citation
omitted), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/07192013/Reimer%2007192013.pdf.
14. See infra Part I.D. (discussing the MPC’s default mens rea provision).
15. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 12; Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are
Here, There, Everywhere, 28 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2013); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing With The Rules: An
Effort To Strengthen The Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
685 (2011); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537 (2012).
16. See supra note 13.
17. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, House Judiciary
Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over-Criminalization (May 5, 2013),
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/5/housejudiciarycommitteecreatesbipartisantaskforceo
novercriminalization.
18. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27–30. This Comment will evaluate the first
two recommendations—a default mens rea rule and codifying the rule of lenity—because they will
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This Comment will first explore the issue of mens rea at the federal level and
the federal courts understanding of mens rea in federal criminal offenses. Next,
the Comment will discuss the federal courts’ interpretation and use of the rule
of lenity to interpret statutes that are silent as to mens rea for an offense. Further,
this Comment will review the MPC’s default mens rea provisions and the
application of these provisions in various states. The Comment will analyze two
proposed recommendations from various organizations that urge Congress to
enact legislation that would codify the rule of lenity and enact some form of a
default mens rea provision. Finally, this Comment will propose the appropriate
language for a federal default mens rea provision.
I. MENS REA: A CRITICAL MATERIAL ELEMENT SOMETIMES NEGLECTED
A. Intent: The “essential element of a crime”19
To be held liable for a crime, one must have committed the physical
components (actus rei) combined with the particular state of mind required for
the wrongful act (mens rea).20 Generally, a defendant will not be found guilty
for an offense if he or she did not have the requisite mental state required by the
common law or the statute.21 Justice Robert Jackson described the necessity of
mens rea as no “provincial or transient notion,” and stated that “an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention” and that it was the “duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”22
Nearly every state codified common law crimes and, when those statutes
omitted the intent requirement, the general presumption was that the requisite
intent was so obvious that it was unnecessary to expend additional words in the
language of the statute specifically addressing intent. 23 At the federal level,
there is no criminal code per se, but most of the criminal statutes are codified

have a greater and more immediate impact on addressing overcriminalization at the federal level.
The institutional reforms in Congress will only deter or limit the future codification of criminal
offenses or penalties.
19. RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 60 (1957).
20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (9th ed. 2009). Mens rea is Latin for a guilty mind. Id.
at 1075. It is the mental state the defendant must have had at the time when committing the “social
harm” or actus rei elements defined in the offense. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 150.
21. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 150.
22. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
23. Id. at 252 (observing that when “state[s] codified the common law of crimes, even if their
enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the
offense that it required no statutory affirmation”).
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under Title 18 of the United States Code.24 Federal criminal offenses are “solely
creatures of statute” and it is Congress’ province to define each element.25
Congress often neglects to include an intent requirement when codifying a
common law offense or creating a new criminal offense.26 When determining
the mental state of a federal crime, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“construction of the statute and of inference of the intent of Congress” is
required.27 In Morissette v. United States, a World War II veteran and scrap iron
collector was convicted of knowingly converting spent bomb casings that were
technically U.S. military property. 28 Morissette loaded, crushed, and
transported the spent casings without attempting to conceal his actions.29 When
the government opened an investigation, he voluntarily told his story and
admitted everything, claiming that he had no intention of stealing and genuinely
believed the spent casings were abandoned property.30 He was subsequently
convicted and appealed on the grounds that he did not have the requisite criminal
intent to be convicted.31 The appellate court found that this particular federal
offense required no element of criminal intent because Congress failed to
include it in the statute.32 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, unless
specified by Congress, when Congress passes an act “merely adopting into
federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law”
it “presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached” to the
common law offense.33

24. See Moohr, supra note 15, at 687 (labeling Title 18 “the nominal federal criminal code”).
Congressman Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, the ranking member of the Over-Criminalization Task
Force, has observed that the federal criminal code “is neither thoughtful nor is it organized in a way
that gives citizens fair notice of which behavior is lawful and which might land them in jail.”
Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task
Force, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Member, H. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
25. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (citing United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
26. See Luna, supra note 15, at 708.
27. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922). Where Congressional intent is crystal
clear, the Court has recognized there is very little room for either a court or an administrative or
regulatory agency to interpret legislative intent. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”).
28. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247–48.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 248.
31. Id. at 248–49.
32. Id. at 250.
33. Id. at 262–63. Justice Jackson further stated that when Congress codifies a common law
offense, the silence as to mens rea “may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in
creating an offence new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except
the Act.” Id. at 262.
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B. Non-Common Law Federal Offenses and Mens Rea—Sometimes an
Afterthought?
For non-common law offenses, the Supreme Court has stated that generally
“a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal.”34 In Staples v.
United States, a man was convicted of unlawful possession of an unregistered
machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act.35 The defendant claimed
he had no idea that his AR-15 rifle, a semiautomatic weapon, which did not need
to be registered pursuant to the National Firearms Act, had been modified to fire
automatically. 36 The modification made the rifle an automatic weapon or a
machine gun as defined by the law and thus it required registration. 37 The
offense statute was “silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation.”38
The Court held that “absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not
required” it would not “interpret any statute defining a felony offense as
dispensing with mens rea.”39
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court affirmed
that the state must prove mens rea in order to convict an individual of
committing a crime.40 Gypsum, in part, concerned whether there was a mens rea
requirement in a criminal antitrust offense under the Sherman Antitrust Act.41
The federal government charged the Gypsum Company, a manufacturer of a
laminated type of wallboard, with conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.42 The defendants challenged the jury instructions, which
charged that “if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise,
fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a
matter of law, to have intended that result.”43 The Supreme Court held that a
“defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense
which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and
34. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994). The Court qualified this for cases
where “dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of
traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress
did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.” Id. at 618–19.
35. Id. at 603–04.
36. Id. at 603.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 605.
39. Id. at 618.
40. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (stating that “[t]he
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence” (alteration in the original) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
500 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. Id. at 426.
42. Id. at 426–27.
43. Id. at 434. The government argued that this jury instruction was consistent with previous
Supreme Court decisions holding that an agreement by sellers to share pricing information violates
the Sherman Antitrust Act if such an agreement has either the purpose or the effect of price
stabilization. Id. at 435.
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cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.”44 Further, the Court stated
that Congress would need to do “far more than the simple omission” of an intent
requirement in order to dispense with mens rea.45
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Morissette, Gypsum, and Staples stand for
the rule that mens rea should only be dispensed in limited circumstances or when
expressly dispatched by Congress. As a result, much uncertainty remains as to
when a law-abiding citizen becomes a criminal.
C. The Rule of Lenity and Ambiguity in the Law—Sometimes a Defendant’s
Only Defense
The common law rule of lenity “requires ambiguous criminal laws to be
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”46 The rule expresses
an important principal in criminal law that no one should be punished for
violating an ambiguous statute whose commands or prohibitions are unclear.47
The rule also encourages legislatures to be clear when enacting criminal offenses
or penalties to ensure that courts do not take it upon themselves to provide their
own visions of clarity.48 This has the added benefit that courts are not taking it
upon themselves to expand or change statutes without the direct consent of the
people’s elected representatives.49
In United States v. Santos, the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity in
interpreting a federal money laundering statute. 50 The defendant operated a
lottery and employed several individuals who collected bets from gamblers,
received a commission, and delivered the rest of the money collected to the
defendant. 51 The defendant challenged his conviction, contending that the

44. Id. at 435.
45. Id. at 438.
46. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also United States v. Gradwell,
243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917) (observing that “before a man can be punished as a criminal under the
federal law his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the provisions of some statute
(quoting United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890))); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.
25, 27 (1931) (stating that “[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text
of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain
line is passed”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–49 (1971) (arguing that ambiguities in
criminal statutes “should be resolved in favor of lenity” and the legislatures, not the courts should
determine what is criminal because “criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
47. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 885, 916–17 (2004) (discussing the impact of the rule of lenity on the legislatures and the
electorate).
50. Santos, 553 U.S. at 513–14.
51. Id. at 509.
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money collected was receipts and not profits.52 The issue before the Court was
whether “criminal proceeds” in the federal money laundering statute means
“receipts” or “profits.”53 Searching for a precise meaning, the Court determined
that the ordinary meaning of “proceeds” can include both “profits” and
“receipts.” 54 Further frustrating matters, the Court also found that Congress
defined the term in other criminal provisions to mean either “profits” or
“receipts.” 55 The Court held that such an interpretive tie must benefit the
defendant, because of the Court’s findings of ambiguity regarding the use of the
word elsewhere in the same statute.56
In United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., a tax levied under the
National Fire Arms Act, which carried criminal penalties for failing to comply
with the Act’s provisions and imposed such penalties without proof of
willfulness or knowledge, was challenged on the basis of ambiguity. 57
Specifically, the defendant challenged what it meant to “make” a firearm
covered under the Act.58 The defendant manufactured pistols, which were not a
covered category of firearms, and packaged the pistols with conversion kits.59
The kits allowed consumers to convert the pistols into short-barrel rifles, which
were a covered category of firearms.60 The Court stated that it was necessary to
invoke the rule of lenity because the statute “has criminal applications that carry
no additional requirement of willfulness.”61
In Ratzlaf v. United States, the Court used the rule of lenity to read a mens rea
requirement into a federal statute requiring banks to file reports with the
Secretary of Treasury if the bank is involved in a cash transaction exceeding
$10,000.62 The statute also made it illegal to structure such transactions in order
to avoid the reporting threshold. 63 The defendant, needing to pay a Nevada
casino $100,000 for a gambling debt, was charged with “structuring
transactions” in violation of the Act for purchasing $100,000 total in cashier’s
52. Id. The defendant based his position on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the money laundering statute, aruing that the law’s “prohibition
of transactions involving criminal ‘proceeds’ applies only to transactions involving criminal profits,
not criminal receipts.” Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir.
2002)).
53. Id. at 515.
54. Id. at 511.
55. Id. at 511–12.
56. Id. at 514.
57. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 507–08, 517 (1992).
58. Id. at 508, 517.
59. Id. at 508.
60. Id. The same conversion kit could also be used to convert the pistol into a long-barrel
rifle, which was also not covered by the statute. See id. at 507.
61. Id. at 517.
62. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994) (explaining that the term
“willfully” requires “something more”).
63. Id. at 136.
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checks.64 Each check was just under the $10,000 reporting threshold and all of
them were purchased from several different banks.65 The trial court instructed
the jury “that the Government had to prove [the] defendant’s knowledge of the
banks’ reporting obligation and his attempt to evade that obligation, but did not
have to prove [the] defendant knew the structuring was unlawful.”66
The defendant was found guilty and argued on appeal that his conviction for
“willfully violating” the statute could not stand “solely on the basis of his
knowledge that a financial institution must report currency transactions in excess
of $10,000 and his intention to avoid such reporting.” 67 Agreeing with the
defendant, the Supreme Court held that in order to convict under the statute, “the
jury had to find [the defendant] knew the structuring in which he engaged was
unlawful.”68 Congress, disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the statute, subsequently amended the law to dispense specifically with the intent
requirement necessary to prove such a violation.69
D. Attacking Overcriminalization Head On: The Model Penal Code’s Default
Mens Rea Provision
The drafters of the MPC sought to ensure that criminal convictions could only
be achieved by proving an intent element for each offense. 70 This goal was
achieved, in part, by adopting a default mens rea provision.71 The MPC mens
rea provision, section 2.02(3), states that “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element
is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect
thereto.”72
Section 2.05 exempts the culpability requirements of section 2.02(3) from
offenses resulting in nothing more than fines or other civil penalties or if the
legislature specifically dispenses with an intent requirement.73 However, the
64. Id. at 137.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Id. at 137–38.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 149.
69. Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411,
108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2012))).
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (providing
the different levels of culpability).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 2.02(3). The kinds of culpability mentioned—purposely, knowingly and
recklessly—are defined in subsection 2 of section 2.02. Id. § 2.02(1). The drafters commented that
subsection 3 simply adopts the “basic norm” that had been “regarded as the common law position.”
Id. § 2.02 cmt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955). The drafters specifically left out negligence as a
default culpability because of the “exceptional basis of [such] liability” and stated that “it should
be excluded unless explicitly prescribed.” Id.
73. Id. § 2.05 explanatory note.
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drafters stated a preference that strict liability should be reserved for noncriminal offenses.74 Under the MPC, “violations are not [] crimes [as defined
by] section 1.04(5) and cannot result in a sentence of probation or
imprisonment.”75 The drafters commented that section 2.05 is a “frontal attack
on absolute or strict liability in the penal law, whenever the offense carries the
possibility of criminal conviction, for which a sentence of probation or
imprisonment may be imposed.”76
E. Default Mens Rea—An Effective Overcriminalization Safety Valve
Fourteen states have adopted a mens rea provision either identical or very
similar to the MPC’s section 2.02(3).77 Additionally, eight states have adopted
provisions similar to both the default mens rea provision and section 2.05. 78
These statutes require legislatures to specifically dispatch with an intent
requirement in order to create a strict liability offense.79 The success of the
default mens rea provision in these states varies and the application of these
provisions is not always as consistent as the MPC’s drafters envisioned.80
1. Default Mens Rea as a Defense Against Strict Liability in Texas
Texas adopted a provision similar to the MPC’s default mens rea provision.
Section 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides that if an offense does not
prescribe a culpable mental state, and the legislature has not specifically

74. Id.
75. Id. The Model Penal Code defines a violation as follows:
An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a violation
if it so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence
than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon conviction or
if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides that the offense shall
not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a
violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction
of a criminal offense.
Id. § 1.04(5).
76. Id. § 2.05 cmt. 1 (footnote omitted).
77. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., MENS REA AND STATE CRIMES 18–65 (2012), available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20120904_Baker2012Website.pdf (surveying the impact of
the MPC’s mens rea provisions on state criminal codes).
78. Id. at 18–49. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Id.
79. Id. (discussing the eight states’ statutory language and case law regarding mens rea).
80. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 739 P.2d 781 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Coleman v. State, 671
S.W.2d 221 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Upshur v. State, 420 A.2d. 165 (Del. 1980); State v. Whitney,
912 P.2d 596 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); State v. White, 28 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Eldred, 564 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1997); Middleburg Heights v. Bowman, No. 05-01156, 2006 WL
3028463 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006); State v. Turner, 953 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
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dispensed with it as it relates to any material element, then “intent, knowledge,
or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.”81
Texas courts have shown a willingness to use the default mens rea provisions,
except with certain offenses lacking mens rea. In general, strict liability
offenses, such as statutory rape and driving while intoxicated (DWI), are often
attacked for failure to include a mens rea requirement or a lack of a specific
dispensation of one. 82 But Texas courts rarely subject these offenses to the
default mens rea provision, even if the legislature did not specifically dispense
with it. 83 For example, in Byrne v. State, the defendant sought to have his
statutory rape conviction overturned.84 He argued that section 6.02 imposed a
mens rea requirement on Texas’ statutory rape law and that he did not have a
culpable state of mind because he did not know the girl was underage.85 The
Texas statutory rape law does not require the State to prove a culpable mental
state with regard to the victim’s age and the legislature did not specifically
dispense with a mens rea requirement for this material element.86 However, the
court found that in the thirty-seven years the default mens rea provision had been
law in Texas, courts consistently upheld strict liability sex crimes—particularly
sex crimes committed by adults against minors—notwithstanding section 6.02.87
Historically, with regard to other strict liability offenses, defendants charged
with a DWI have made several attempts to set aside their convictions on the
grounds that the DWI offense does not require a culpable mental state and the
State should have to prove some mens rea component. 88 Texas courts have
81. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2013). Unlike the MPC, the Texas default mens
rea provision refers to “intent” rather than acting “purposely.” Id.
82. See Byrne v. State, 358 S.W.3d. 745, 751–52 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing arguments
by the defendant-appellant that his statutory rape conviction should be overturned because the state
failed to establish a mens rea component); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.3d 728, 729 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996) (noting that the court did not believe the legislature intended to include a mens rea
requirement in the DWI statute).
83. See cases cited supra note 82.
84. Byrne, 358 S.W.3d. at 747.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 752.
87. Id. But see State v. Howard, 172 S.W.3d 190, 191–94 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (overturning
a Dallas City Code violation criminalizing touching at “sexually oriented businesses” for failure to
include a culpable mental state).
88. See, e.g., Palacio v. State, No. 01-95-01561-CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5857, at *2 (Tex.
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1997) (citing Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)) (deciding
that “the Legislature did not intend to require a culpable mental state for DWI offenses”); Sanders
v. State, 936 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the DWI statute did not require a
culpable mental state even during the period of time that the offense was transferred from the civil
statutes to the criminal code, which was before the legislature specifically exempted several
offenses including DWI from the default mens rea provision); Pope v. State, No. 01-95-0187-CR,
1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4697, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1996) (citing Chunn, 923 S.W.2d at
728–29) (holding that the State was not required to prove a culpable state of mind with regards to
appellant-defendant’s challenge to his DWI); Chunn, 923 S.W.2d at 729 (holding that the Texas
legislature clearly did not intend to require a culpable state of mind when it removed the DWI
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generally held, without addressing the fact that the legislature did not explicitly
dispense with mens rea, that a DWI offense did not require a culpable state of
mind because intoxication impairs judgment.89 The courts believe that if such a
burden was required, most intoxicated drivers would escape conviction as a
direct result of “their diminished capacity to formulate a criminal intent.” 90
However, due to defendants using the default mens rea provision as a defense,
the Texas legislature eventually amended the DWI offense to explicitly dispense
with a mens rea element.91
2. Bear Gallbladder and Cocaine Sales—Offenses Outside Oregon’s
Criminal Code and Default Mens Rea
Oregon adopted provisions similar both to the MPC’s default mens rea
provision and the MPC section 2.05, which excludes violations outside the
state’s criminal code.92 Oregon’s default mens rea statute, contained in section
161.115(2) of the Oregon Revised Statues, states that “if a statute defining an
offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless
required and is established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence.”93 A violation exclusion similar to the
MPC’s can be found in section 161.105, which establishes that a culpable state
of mind is not required if the offense “constitutes a violation” or is “an offense
defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code [and] clearly indicates a
legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement.”94
Oregon courts use a straightforward approach when applying the default mens
rea statute. 95 The courts are also eager to interpret the violation exception,
offense from the civil statutes to the criminal code, as emphasized by the legislature’s enactment
of a subsequent statute exempting certain offenses from section 6.02); Ex Parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d
214, 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that despite the legislature’s enactment of the default mens
rea provision, section 6.02, the legislature did not intend to require proof of a culpable mental state
for certain offenses in the civil code including DWI).
89. Aguirre v. State, 928 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
90. Id.
91. Sanders, 936 S.W.2d at 437.
92. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.105(1)(b) (West 2013).
93. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(2) (West 2013). Similar to Texas, Oregon includes the
mens rea term “intentionally” instead of the MPC’s “purposely.” Id. The Oregon statute is also
broader than the MPC in that it also includes “criminal negligence” in the default mens rea
provision. Id. The commentary on the proposed Oregon Criminal Code stated that the default mens
rea provision “will do away with the problem that now often arises when a statute defining a crime
fails to prescribe a required culpable state of mind.” See State v. Fitch, 543 P.2d 20, 21 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975) (applying the default mens rea provision to Oregon’s criminal trespass statute and
reading into the statute that “a person commits the crime of criminal trespass . . . if he ‘intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence’ ‘enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling’”).
94. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.105(1).
95. See State v. Taylor, 561 P.2d 662, 663 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (overturning a lower court’s
dismissal of charges of driving with a suspended license for lack of the “necessary element of
mental culpability” because the offense is statutorily defined outside the criminal code and no
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which permits the legislature not to require mens rea for violations enacted
outside the state’s criminal code.96
In State v. Cho, a man “was convicted of offering to purchase the gall bladder
of a bear” in violation of Oregon’s wildlife protection law and was fined.97 He
was sentenced to thirty days in jail and two years of probation.98 The defendant
challenged his conviction, arguing that the state failed to prove a culpable state
of mind, or alternatively, that the offense was a violation, not a misdemeanor,
and, therefore, his sentence should not have included a lengthy jail or probation
sentence.99 The Supreme Court of Oregon, applying the violation exception in
section 161.105, found that in order for the legislature to enact a criminal offense
outside the state’s criminal code, the legislature must “provide[] that [the]
offense is not a violation, and for the offense to clearly indicate a legislative
intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement.” 100 Because
violation of the wildlife protection law carried a criminal penalty, the court
stated that, pursuant to section 161.105, a culpable mental state is required unless
the legislature specifically dispensed with the requirement.101 The court could
not find any “indication of a legislative intent to dispense with a [mens rea
requirement] for a breach of [the state’s] wildlife [protection] law.” 102
Therefore, the court held that in order to commit a crime under this particular
wildlife protection law, “a person must act with a culpable mental state.”103
In State v. Rutley, a man was convicted of violating an Oregon statute
criminalizing the delivery of certain controlled substances.104 In this case, the
defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer within 1,000 feet of a
school.105 The trial court held that the defendant’s knowledge of whether he was
mental state is required pursuant to Oregon’s default rules permitting the legislature to omit mens
rea for violations); State v. Hash, 578 P.2d 482, 484 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the offense
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon contained no express culpable mental state,
did not meet any of the exceptions under § 161.05, and was subject to the default mens rea provision
for each material element of the offense); State v. Gartzke, 592 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that the offense of criminal nonsupport of a child did not include an express culpable
mental state and thus required application of the Oregon default mens rea provision).
96. See cases cited in supra note 95.
97. State v. Cho, 681 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Or. 1984).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1156.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1157.
103. Id. The state argued that the intent of the legislature when enacting Oregon’s wildlife
protection laws was to “represent a substantial government interest in the preservation of wildlife.”
Id. The court agreed, but failed to see how that supported the state’s contention that these laws are
strict liability crimes and held that a substantial state interest in the preservation of wildlife cannot
substitute for the need for clear legislative intent to dispense with a mens rea requirement for a
breach of these laws. Id.
104. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 361 (Or. 2007).
105. Id.

1010

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:997

within 1,000 feet of a school was not a necessary element.106 However, the court
of appeals disagreed and held that proving knowledge would be necessary to
convict.107 The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the offense
was enacted outside the criminal code, the legislature clearly intended “to give
drug dealers a reason to locate the 1,000-foot school boundary and stay outside
it—by punishing the failure to do so as the most serious of crimes.”108 Oregon’s
Supreme Court further concluded that the omission of mens rea for the attendant
circumstances that would bring the defendant within this offense was obviously
“purposeful” on the part of the legislature.109 The court found that the legislature
clearly indicated its intent to dispense with mens rea.110
3. Securities Fraud and Cutting Too Much Timber Without Consent—
Default Mens Rea in Illinois
Illinois also adopted a provision similar to the MPC’s default provision and
has developed a fairly consistent approach to its application.111 Section 4-3 of
the Illinois Criminal Code states that an individual “is not guilty of an offense,
other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to
each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having
one of the mental states” of intent, knowledge, or recklessness.112
In People v. Whitlow, the defendants were charged and convicted of twelve
counts of conspiracy, theft, and other violations of Illinois Securities Law.113
The defendants challenged their convictions based on the statutory silence
regarding the culpable mental state in the various sections of the Securities
Law.114 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the securities law provisions at
issue were silent as to whether a culpable state of mind was necessary to

106. Id.
107. Id. at 361–62.
108. Id. at 365. The court further commented that “requiring a knowing mental state with
regard to the distance element would work against the obvious legislative purpose, in that it would
create an incentive for drug deals not to identify schools, and not to take into consideration their
distance from them in engaging in their illegal activity.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court also commented that “no mental state is logically required for a distance
element.” Id.
111. See People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d. 450, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (holding that the default
mens rea statute required the state to prove a culpable state of mind because mob action is an
offense punishable by incarceration and there was no clear legislative intent to impose absolute
liability); see also People v. Abdul-Mutkabbir, 692 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding
that the offense of falsely representing oneself as a licensed attorney is not an absolute liability
offense and because the legislature did not state a required mental state of culpability and provided
no language to explicitly dispense with mens rea, the default mens rea provision must apply).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3 (West 2013). This section of the Illinois statute
references the sections that define the mental states rather than listing the three separately. Id.
113. People v. Whitlow, 433 N.E.2d. 629, 631 (Ill. 1982).
114. Id. at 633.
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convict.115 Applying the default mens rea provision, the court stated that if the
charged provisions of the Securities Act were not absolute liability offenses, then
a culpable mental state was required.116
In People v. Langford, the defendant was charged with a Class 4 felony
violation of the Timber Buyers Licensing Act for cutting and appropriating
timber without the consent of the timber grower. 117 The defendant pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor offense under the same Act.118 The trial court imposed
the maximum sentence, ordering the defendant to serve one year in county
jail.119 The defendant unsuccessfully moved to have his guilty plea withdrawn
arguing that the state “failed to allege a mental state.”120 The appellate court
reversed holding that the Act did not include a culpable mental state and that it
was not an absolute liability offense as argued by the state.121 The appellate
court stated that “[a]bsolute liability cannot be imposed for an offense for which
the offender may be jailed unless the legislature clearly indicated its intent to
require that result.”122 The court could not find any support in the text of the
Act or its legislative history for the contention that the offense was an absolute
liability offense.123
III. RULE OF LENITY VS. THE MODEL PENAL CODE: WHICH APPROACH IS
MOST EFFECTIVE TO STOP OVERCRIMINALIZATION?
A. The Rule of Lenity is Insufficient in Its Case-By-Case Application
Advocates for reform have urged that codifying the common law rule of lenity
“would reduce the risk of injustice stemming from criminal offenses that lack
clarity or specificity.”124 The Supreme Court has shown that it is not shy in
applying the rule when statutes are ambiguous or vague.125

115. Id. at 633.
116. Id. at 633–34. In determining which of the four default mental states to apply, the court
looked at the federal Securities Act of 1933, which is very similar to the Illinois Securities Act. Id.
However, the federal securities law requires a person to have acted “willfully.” Id. at 633–34. The
court ultimately determined that “knowing” was most analogous, adopting reasoning from the U.S.
Supreme Court that the essential elements of securities offenses require a mental state that
“embraces intentional or knowing misconduct.” Id. at 634.
117. People v. Langford, 552 N.E.2d 274, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 276.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28. Walsh and Joslyn state that “[t]he rule of lenity
directs a court, when construing an ambiguous criminal law, to resolve the ambiguity in favor of
the defendant. Adding the rule of lenity to federal law would serve the rights of all defendants at
every stage of the criminal process.” Id.
125. See supra notes 46–69 and accompanying text.
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Santos and Thompson/Arms both illustrate the application of this approach,
because they address an ambiguity with a particular word or clarify the mens rea
element in a statute.126 Advocates for codification of the rule of lenity correctly
argue that the Supreme Court’s use of the rule “is consistent with the traditional
rules that all defendants are presumed innocent and that the government bears
the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”127
Further, the Court’s use of the rule of lenity in favor of the criminally accused
will force Congress to review already enacted criminal offenses in light of the
Court’s interpretation, which will compel debates and votes on either a fix or a
clarification of Congress’ original intent. 128 The ultimate goal of many
advocates is for Congress, and legislatures generally, to review the criminal
offenses codified and to clarify their intent when the average citizen, and her
lawyer, are left dumbfounded that she has been charged with a crime that she
had no idea she committed.129
As seen in Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court used the rule of lenity to read a mens
rea requirement into a monetary reporting and anti-structuring of transactions
statute with criminal penalties in favor of the defendant.130 The defendant was
aware of the reporting requirements for large transactions, but unaware that
structuring payments to avoid the reporting threshold was in contravention of
the law.131 Congress, disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
statute, acted swiftly to amend the law clarifying that no mens rea was required
to prove a violation of structuring payments to avoid the reporting threshold.132
126. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 508 (1992).
127. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28. Walsh and Joslyn point out that the Supreme
Court has called the rule of lenity “a fundamental rule of statutory construction.” Id. In United
States v. Bass, the Court referred to the rule as a “wise principle[] this court has long followed.”
404 U.S. 335, 347 (1971). Nevertheless, Walsh and Joslyn state that:
[d]espite the Supreme Court’s statements, the rule has not been uniformly or consistently
applied by the lower federal courts, and adding it to federal law would serve the rights of
all defendants at every stage of the criminal process, not just those who have the means
and opportunity to successfully appeal their convictions to the Supreme Court.
WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28.
128. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28; see also Price, supra note 49 at 915–16
(examining the impact of the judiciary’s use of the rule of lenity on the legislative and executive
branches).
129. See id. at 29 (discussing the benefits of compelling Congress to draft “mens rea
requirements that are no broader than necessary to allow conviction of only those who are truly
culpable or blameworthy”); see also Price, supra note 49 at 916–17 (stating that “[t]he rule of lenity
ensures that legislators must take [a] more exacting path” when drafting legislation that criminalizes
conduct).
130. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137–38 (1994).
131. Id. The Court reiterated “the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no
defense to a criminal charge.” Id. at 149. However, in order to convict Ratzlaf, “the jury had to
find [the defendant] knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful.” Id.
132. Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Reporting and the Crime
of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 510–11 (2010) (stating that “[w]hen Congress

2014]

A Proposed Federal Default Mens Rea Provision

1013

Although Congress’ amendment to the law was contrary to the view that mens
rea should generally be required when criminal sanctions are applied, Ratzlaf at
least made Congress aware that it was not being clear enough when it drafted
the statute.133
The pitfall of the rule of lenity is that it is often a court’s last resort when
interpreting the statutory language of an offense.134 Courts traditionally first
consider each and every aspect of the statute at issue, how its text relates to other
provisions, and then determine the intention of the legislature.135 The logical
analysis is to look for the plain meaning first, and then delve into the legislative
history of a statute. However, in his plurality opinion in United States v. Santos,
Justice Scalia advocated for dispensing of the legislative history inquiry and
determining immediately whether a statute is on its face ambiguous and then
applying the rule of lenity.136 Granted in instances where mental culpability is
at question in a criminal offense, such an application of the rule of lenity may be
appropriate. 137 Ultimately, a codified rule of lenity may not be enough to
distract courts from the traditional avenues of statutory interpretation and will
likely only be applied for the most ambiguous of statutes on a case-by-case basis.
B. The Model Penal Code’s Default Mens Rea Provision Has Helped Stem the
Tide of Overcriminalization at the State Level When Properly Applied
The Model Penal Code’s default mens rea provisions are stemming the tide
of overcriminalization at the state level in states that have adopted these
provisions but not necessarily at the expense of overturning commonly accepted
strict liability offenses. Advocates for reform argue that enacting a default mens
rea statute at the federal level “would help law-abiding individuals know in
advance which criminal offenses carry an unavoidable risk of criminal
punishment and safeguard against unintentional legislative omissions of mens
rea requirements.”138 Additionally, advocates point out that Congress, like state
legislatures that have adopted the default rule, “would remain free to enact strict

overruled Ratzlaf and relaxed the mens rea elements of the structuring offense, it increased the
danger that the structuring statute could be misused” (emphasis added)).
133. See id. (discussing Congress’ reaction to the Ratzlaf decision).
134. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513 (2008) (explaining the Court’s application of
the rule of lenity); see also Price, supra note 49, at 890–91 (analyzing the rule of lenity’s place in
the statutory interpretation hierarchy).
135. Price, supra note 49, at 890–91.
136. Santos, 553 U.S. at 513–14.
137. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
138. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27. The report’s authors state that enacting a default
mens rea provision is “perhaps the most straightforward and effective reform.” Id. A federal
default mens rea provision “would greatly reduce the disparities that exist among the federal courts
in the interpretation and application of mens rea requirements, and thereby result in the fairer, more
consistent application of federal criminal laws.” Id. at 27.
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liability offenses even after this reform is implemented, but to do so, it would
have to make its purpose clear in the express language of the statute.”139
States that have adopted similar or identical provisions to the MPC’s default
rules preserve the legislature’s ability to enact strict liability offenses without
expressly dispatching mens rea for certain offenses. Several cases interpreting
Texas’ default mens rea provision involved defendants’ failed attempts to attack
common strict liability offenses, such as statutory rape and driving while
intoxicated. 140 For instance, in Byrne v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals
dismissed an attempt to require the state to prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge that the girl involved was underage.141 The court based its holding
on the fact that no court in Texas had ever applied the default provision to the
offense of statutory rape in the decades following the adoption of the default
provision, rather than whether the state legislature specifically dispatched a
culpable mental state element.142 When asked to apply the default rules to a
DWI offense, which lacked a specific mens rea requirement and no specific
language dispensing it, Texas courts declined to apply the default mens rea
provision because requiring a culpable state of mind for DWI would make the
offense meaningless given that intoxication impairs judgment. 143 This
application is logical because, if the court required the government to prove that
the intoxicated individual drove while intoxicated purposely, knowingly, or at
least recklessly, then the accused would be allowed to get off by simply
testifying: “I had no idea I was too drunk to drive.”144
For the types of regulatory offenses that may carry a criminal penalty, the
MPC’s default mens rea rules have proven to be an effective tool to protect those
without a morally blameworthy state of mind.145 This was effectively the case
in State v. Cho, where the defendant was convicted of violating Oregon’s
wildlife protection laws by attempting to purchase a bear gallbladder.146 The
Oregon Supreme Court used the state’s default provisions almost exactly as
envisioned by the drafters of the MPC for such an offense.147 Finding that the
Oregon legislature had not specifically dispatched with mens rea and that the
criminal offense was outside the criminal code, the court held that the legislature
would have to specifically make the offense a strict liability offense if that was

139. Id. Other than highlighting the relevant provisions of the MPC, Walsh and Joslyn do not
propose what a federal default mens rea provision would look like exactly.
140. See supra Part I.E.1.
141. Byrne v. State, 358 S.W.3d. 745, 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
142. Byrne, 358 S.W.3d. at 749–50.
143. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
144. See Florance v. State, No. 05-08-00707-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3188, at *12–14
(Tex. Ct. App. May 8, 2009) (concluding that the legislature intended to dispense with mens rea
for the offense of drinking while underage despite neglecting to do so specifically).
145. See supra Part I.D.
146. State v. Cho, 681 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Or. 1984).
147. See id. at 1156–57; see also supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
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the legislature’s intent.148 Because the legislature had failed to do so, applying
the default mens rea provision was necessary.149 Such an application by federal
courts to the numerous regulatory offenses that carry criminal penalties could
prevent the type of public welfare offenses that are too obscure to not require
mens rea. Generally, the states that have enacted a default mens rea provision
use it to draw a bright line between offenses that do not carry a criminal sanction
and those that do.150
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S DEFAULT MENS REA PROVISION IS THE BEST
CURE FOR THE AILS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A default mens rea provision may not be as clear-cut or easy to draft at the
federal level, but nevertheless it may be a more effective approach to solving the
problem of federal overcriminalization.151 Codification of the rule of lenity may
be a good supplemental safeguard, but courts should not be so quick to dispense
with legislative intent, especially if the legislative history can help the court
reach a reasonable meaning.152
An issue with creating a default mens rea provision is that the exact wording
in the MPC may not work well at the federal level.153 Congress would have to
determine which mens rea term or terms should be the default.154 Additionally,
Congress would also need to determine the precise meaning of the chosen
default term.155 Congress generally includes an intent element of “knowingly,”
which the Supreme Court has interpreted to only mean “requir[ing] proof of
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”156 Congress sometimes also
148. Cho, 681 P.2d at 1156.
149. Id. at 1157.
150. See supra Part I.E.
151. Moohr, supra note 15, at 704. Moohr also comments that “[t]raditionally, courts find
ambiguity only after first using other interpretive devices to divine Congress’s intent in enacting
the statute.” Id. at 709. Generally, a statute’s alleged ambiguity would only be addressed after
exhausting every other statutory interpretive tool. Id. at 709.
152. See Moohr, supra note 15, at 709. Justice Souter has indicated that the Court will use the
rule of lenity after exhausting other factors that help determine the legislative intent. Id.
153. This primarily stems from the differences and inconsistency in terminology of mens rea
terms throughout the U.S. Code. See The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 10–11
(statement of Dr. John S. Baker, Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School; Professor
Emeritus, LSU Law School), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/
07192013/Baker%2007192013.pdf.
154. See Moohr, supra note 15, at 704 (stating that “[i]f Congress is genuinely concerned about
the integrity of the mens rea element, it will specifically identify and define what culpability
standard is sufficient to protect those not blameworthy for violating a criminal law”). Others have
pointed out that the reforms in the Model Penal Code came about “during a relatively short and
historically exceptional period, when reform efforts were politically welcome and eventually
embraced by lawmakers.” Luna, supra note 15, at 731.
155. Moohr, supra note 15, at 702–03.
156. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.
184, 193 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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uses the term “willfully,” which generally also requires a showing that the
defendant “acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”157 However,
some advocates for reform suggest that if Congress were to adopt a default mens
rea provision, it should use the mens rea term “willfully” because it is more
universally understood.158 Additionally, a default mens rea requirement may
give federal prosecutors pause before overzealously prosecuting people based
on federal laws lacking mens rea that allow for easier convictions.159
A federal default mens rea provision may have very well saved Wade Martin,
the Alaskan Native, discussed at the beginning of this Comment, who
unknowingly violated the federal Mammal Protection Act, from criminal
prosecution. 160 Martin was aware of his obligations under the law, which
prohibited the sale to non-natives, and understood that the Alaskan native
exception only applied to sales between Alaskan natives. 161 If the federal
government had been required to prove that Martin either “knowingly” or
“willfully” sold sea otters to a non-native, federal prosecutors may have relented
in their pursuit of criminal charges against Martin. It would have been more
appropriate in Martin’s case to simply fine him for the violation thus putting him
on notice to better verify his patrons. A default mens rea provision likely would
have prevented the criminalization of such an allegedly honest mistake.
Congress and state legislatures have shown that they are not shy about
overturning a court’s decision when it contradicts what the legislatures perceived
to be the legislatures’ original intent.162 A default provision may force Congress
to carefully consider and draft new criminal offenses if Congress knows that
failure to either specifically make the new offense strict liability, or explain why
157. Id. (quoting Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 7 n.12 (written statement of Norman
L. Reimer, Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). According to
Reimer, NACDL found that both “willfully” and “knowingly” have the problem of having many
meanings, but NACDL argued that “‘willfully’ is more protective, and more universally
understood, than the term ‘knowingly.’” Id. Also, NACDL stated that federal courts have held
that “‘willfully’ requires proof that a person acted with knowledge that her conduct was . . .
unlawful.” Id.
159. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 7–9 (statement of Dr. John S. Baker,
Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School; Professor Emeritus, LSU Law School). In his
testimony, Baker cited the federal prosecutorial power under the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
which “textually does not provide a mens rea.” Id. at 7. Further, Baker observed that a plain
reading of the Act “literally makes almost any contact with a migratory bird unlawful.” Id.
Although it may be a stretch to claim that prosecutors would be so overzealous in their authority,
Baker states that lower federal courts have disagreed as to whether unintentional conduct is actually
covered by the Act. Id. at 7–8. Baker notes that some will argue that prosecutors may only use the
Act to go after “the bad guys,” but he proposes the question: “[H]ow does one identify the ‘bad
guys’ under a statute having a criminal penalty, but no mens rea?” Id. at 8. Baker posits what
many advocates for reform argue that “[i]nnocent individuals must rely on Congress to represent
and protect them by ensuring that a mens rea is required for criminal punishment.” Id.
160. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
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no mens rea should be required, will subject the new offenses to the default
provisions. As the Supreme Court stated in Staples, “absent a clear statement
from Congress that mens rea is not required,” it would not “interpret any statute
defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea.”163 A culpable state of
mind is a key requisite of a criminal offense and Congress should always try to
better justify its actions when it muddles the contours of mens rea or it fails to
even specify the mens rea when Congress enacts new offenses.164
A. Federal Default Mens Rea Provision—a Proposal
A federal default mens rea provision would have to differ substantially from
the provision in the MPC.165 Section 2.02(3) of the MPC states: “When the
culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not
prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposefully,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”166
A federal default mens rea provision should adopt “willfully” as the default
term.167 While the Supreme Court has stated that “willfully” is “a word of many
meanings” and its use is usually dependent on the context in which it is used,168
the Court stated that at a minimum, in criminal law, “a ‘willful’ act is one
undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” 169 Drawing from Supreme Court
jurisprudence and academic conjecture, a sufficient definition of “willfully” for
purposes of a federal default mens rea provision could be: An individual acts
“willfully” when acting with knowledge that the action or conduct is prohibited
by law.170

163. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
164. See supra Part I.A.
165. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 10–11 (statement of Dr. John S. Baker,
Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School; Professor Emeritus, LSU Law School).
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
167. In testimony before the House Overcriminalization Taskforce, Reimer pointed out that
using “willfully” in a statute would at a minimum separate those who act knowingly and with a bad
purpose. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 7 n.12 (written statement of Norman
L. Reimer, Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
168. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (stating that the word “willfully” is
often “a word of many meanings” and context is key to its construction); United States v. O’Hagan,
139 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “‘willfully’ simply requires the intentional doing of
the wrongful acts—no knowledge of the rule or regulation is required”); United States v. Peltz, 433
F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1970) (commenting that an individual can violate a law “even if he does not
know of its existence”). See also Katherine R. Tromble, Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards:
A Proposed Methodology for Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 521, 538–39 (1999) (pointing out
that sometimes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a “statute’s mens rea standard as ‘willfully’
[is] in contradiction to Congress’ use of the term ‘knowingly’ in the statute” because the Court
“believes Congress drafted [the statute] poorly”).
169. See supra note 169.
170. See supra note 169.
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A federal default mens rea provision should include specific language that
directs judges and federal prosecutors to apply the default provision. 171
Additionally, it should be required that the default mens rea provision be applied
to criminal sanctions, outside of Title 18, lacking a mens rea unless specifically
dispensed with by Congress. 172 This application would help curtail strict
liability offenses and would force Congress to review such offenses on a caseby-case basis to decide whether to dispense with mens rea.173
Combining the MPC’s approach, the proposed definition of “willfully,” and
what many advocates agree a federal default provision would require to be
effective, a proposed federal default mens rea provision may look like the
following:
Sec. XXX Default Culpability
(1) Definition of Default Mental State—For the purposes of default
culpability, an individual acts ‘willfully’ when acting with knowledge
that the action or conduct is prohibited by law.
(2) Applicability within this Title—When the culpability sufficient to
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by a
provision establishing a criminal offense within this title, such element
is established if a person acts willfully with respect thereto.
(3) Applicability outside this Title—When the culpability sufficient to
establish a material element of an offense carrying a criminal penalty
is not prescribed by a provision outside of this title for an offense
established outside of this title, such element is established if a person
acts willfully with respect thereto unless explicit legislative intent to
dispense with any culpable mental state requirement is provided for
within the section establishing the offense.
The proposed language in subsection 2 makes only minor adjustments to the
draft language of the MPC’s default mens rea provision but it should be effective
at the federal level.174 The language of subsection 2 does not necessarily apply
to the numerous offenses within Title 18 that contain no mens rea requirement.
Additionally, the language, if adopted, would require the default mens rea
171. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27 (stating that such a provision would “grant a
criminal defendant the benefit of the doubt when Congress has failed to adequately and clearly
define the mens rea requirements for criminal offenses and penalties”).
172. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28–29. This would also follow closely to section
2.05 of the Model Penal Code, which exempts the culpability requirements of section 2.02(3) for
offenses resulting in nothing more than a fine, or other civil penalty (“violations” under the MPC),
or if the legislature specifically dispenses with an intent requirement to provide for strict liability.
See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. One may arguably extend the basic default mens
rea provision in Title I of the United States Code so that it applies to all 51 sections. However,
Congress may signal that its primary goal is to address the overcriminalization of criminal offenses
and offenses carrying criminal sanctions outside of Title 18 by including the provision in the
primary federal criminal title, Title 18.
173. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28–29.
174. See supra note 166.
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element to be read into any offense in Title 18 that prescribes no mens rea. This
option is in line with the recommendations of many advocates for reform, but
could lead to problems initially.175 For example, it is possible that someone
might challenge the federal statutory rape offense as a strict liability crime.176
Congress could, however, add language specifically exempting these strict
liability offenses within Title 18 from the application of the default mens rea
provision.177
Subsection 3 simply requires that Congress explicitly acknowledge that it did
not intend to require a mens rea element when it enacts certain regulatory
criminal offenses outside of Title 18. The language of subsection 3 attacks the
crux of the federal overcriminalization problem—criminal sanctions for
regulatory offenses outside of Title 18, such as the criminal penalty contained
within the Mammal Protection Act.178 In order to enact a strict liability offense
outside of Title 18, Congress would specifically have to dispense with the mens
rea element. If Congress failed to do so, the default mens rea provision would
kick in and hopefully deter unnecessary criminal prosecutions of individuals
who did not “willfully” break the law.
Congress will ultimately have to determine the best legislative language to
enact, but it is clear that a default mens rea provision will be a key reform to
address federal overcriminalization. Backing for a federal default mens rea
provision is gaining support among key members of both parties on the House
Over-Criminalization Task Force, including the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee.179 However, as experts on the issue have pointed out, it
will be difficult to draft a default mens rea provision that can work with federal
criminal law, as well as the numerous related regulatory offenses.180
175. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27.
176. See supra Part I.E.1. Such challenges would very likely be as ineffective as attempts
made at the state level, but may nevertheless burden courts initially.
177. See Regulatory Crime: Solutions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, OverCriminalization Task Force, 113th Cong. 30–31 (November 14, 2013), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/1f22a094-0f62-49d9-9927-21f85174be11/113-6185566.pdf (during questioning of the witnesses, Dr. John S. Baker and Mr. Lucian E. Dervan, both
suggested that Congress could specifically list offenses that would be excluded from a federal
default mens rea provision).
178. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
179. Regulatory Crime, supra note 177, at 4. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob
Goodlatte stated: “I think there is wide bipartisan agreement that the Judiciary Committee should
consider enacting a default mens rea standard for the federal Code.” Id.
180. Id. at 32–33. During questioning at the November 14, 2013 House Over-Criminalization
Task Force Hearing, Dr. John S. Baker, Jr., stated that drafting a precise default mens rea provision
for the federal level will be incredibly difficult but nevertheless a necessary reform to address the
problem. Id. At a subsequent hearing, Steven Benjamin stated that “[a]bsent a meaningful criminal
intent requirement, an individual’s other legal and constitutional rights cannot adequately protect
that individual from unjust prosecution and punishment for honest mistakes or engaging in conduct
that they had no reason to know was wrongful.” The Crimes on the Books and Committee
Jurisdiction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task Force,
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V. CONCLUSION
The prevalence of overcriminalization at the federal level remains a
significant issue. Reforms have been proposed and it is incumbent on Congress
to act.181 Enacting a default mens rea provision at the federal level, while it may
have shortcomings, will be the most effective method to resolve the problem.
Overcriminalization at the state level appears to be less rampant where states
have adopted the default mens rea provisions of the MPC. Default provisions
will protect those without a guilty mind from being convicted as criminals.
Additionally, they will have the added benefit of forcing Congress to draft new
criminal offenses carefully if it does not want the offense to fall within the
confines of the default provisions.

113th Cong. 7 (2014) (written statement of Steven D. Benjamin, on behalf of National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/03f42488-3df1434b-8734-46a56398f26e/benjamin-testimony.pdf.
181. On February 5, 2014, the House Judiciary Committee reauthorized the OverCriminalization Task Force through August 5, 2014 and it is expected that the Task Force will
release a formal final report in late summer or fall of 2014. See generally Markup of Ratification
of Subcommittee Memberships; Resolution, Reauthorization of the Over-Criminalization Task
Force; and, H.R. 2919, the “Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act,” Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (Resolution establishing the House Committee on the Judiciary
Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/
index.cfm/hearings?ID=C3F2E6BD-07EF-4F3A-9257-3868C6CA7A79. In testimony at the last
hearing of the Over-Criminalization Task Force, Steven Benjamin underscored the urgent need for
Congress to address this problem, stating that “[o]vercriminalization in America has a direct impact
on commerce, free enterprise, and innovation. It also erodes the public’s confidence in a fair and
just criminal justice system.” The Crimes on the Books and Committee Jurisdiction, supra note
180, at 3 (written statement of Steven D. Benjamin, on behalf of National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers).

